TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC
TC Heartland reset the geography of patent litigation. The Court held that for domestic corporations, "resides" in the patent venue statute means the state of incorporation, not any state where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. The decision reaffirmed Fourco Glass and ended the Federal Circuit's broad reading of venue, dramatically reducing patent filings in the Eastern District of Texas.
Holding
The Supreme Court held that, as applied to domestic corporations, the word "resides" in the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), refers only to the state of incorporation. The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), does not supply the definition for purposes of § 1400(b). The Court reaffirmed Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957), and held that subsequent amendments to § 1391 had not modified the meaning of § 1400(b).
Procedural posture and facts
Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC sued TC Heartland LLC in the District of Delaware for patent infringement related to liquid water enhancers. TC Heartland was organized under Indiana law and headquartered in Indiana; it shipped accused products into Delaware but had no other regular and established presence there. TC Heartland moved to dismiss or transfer for improper venue, arguing that under § 1400(b) it did not "reside" in Delaware and did not maintain a "regular and established place of business" there.
The district court denied the motion. The Federal Circuit denied a writ of mandamus. In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Federal Circuit had previously held in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), that 1988 amendments to § 1391(c) had broadened the meaning of "resides" in § 1400(b), so that a corporate defendant resided wherever it was subject to personal jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit applied that reading to TC Heartland and found venue proper. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to revisit VE Holding in light of Fourco.
The Court's reasoning
Justice Thomas, writing for an eight-Justice unanimous Court (Justice Gorsuch did not participate), produced a tightly statutory opinion.
Section 1400(b) and Fourco
Section 1400(b) provides that "[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). Fourco had held in 1957 that "resides" meant the state of incorporation. Fourco was a square holding interpreting § 1400(b) on its own terms, and the Court explained that Fourco rejected the argument that the general venue statute defined "resides" for purposes of patent venue.
The 1988 and 2011 amendments
The Federal Circuit's VE Holding decision had reasoned that the 1988 amendments to § 1391(c), which expanded the definition of corporate residence under the general venue statute, also expanded the meaning of "resides" in § 1400(b). The Supreme Court rejected that reading. The 1988 amendment said that § 1391(c) supplied a definition "[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter." Both § 1391 and § 1400 are within the same chapter, but Fourco had already held that the chapter-wide definition does not apply to § 1400(b), and the 1988 amendment did not show a clear intent to override Fourco's holding. The 2011 amendments reorganized § 1391 but likewise did not overrule Fourco; if anything, they removed the language that had supported VE Holding's reasoning.
Foreign defendants
The Court limited its holding to domestic corporations. It expressed no view on the venue rules for foreign defendants, who are typically subject to broader venue under the general statute and under Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U.S. 706 (1972). Brunette held that aliens may be sued in any district. TC Heartland left that rule undisturbed.
The framework TC Heartland produced
After TC Heartland, patent venue for a domestic-corporation defendant lies in either of two places under § 1400(b):
- Where the defendant resides: the state (and judicial district) of incorporation, full stop.
- Where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business: a two-part test, with both elements required.
The "regular and established place of business" prong was further developed in In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Under Cray, three requirements must be met: (1) there must be a physical place in the district; (2) the place must be a regular and established place of business; and (3) the place must be of the defendant. Each requirement excludes plausible categories — for instance, an employee's home office that the company does not maintain or hold out as its place of business is generally insufficient.
For unincorporated entities and foreign defendants, the framework differs. Limited liability companies and partnerships present their own residence questions. Foreign defendants remain governed by the broader Brunette rule. The Federal Circuit and district courts have addressed these subsidiary questions in a growing body of post-TC Heartland venue case law.
Subsequent application
The most visible consequence has been geographic redistribution. Before TC Heartland, the Eastern District of Texas handled an enormous share of all patent cases — by some measures, over forty percent in peak years — because the broad VE Holding venue rule allowed plaintiffs to file there against any defendant with national sales presence. After TC Heartland, that share dropped sharply. Filings shifted to the District of Delaware (because Delaware is the state of incorporation for many U.S. corporations), to the Western District of Texas (especially the Waco Division under Judge Albright), and to the Northern District of California for technology companies headquartered there.
The shift has had downstream consequences for litigation practice. Local patent rules, scheduling preferences, and stay practices vis-à-vis inter partes review proceedings differ across the destination districts. The District of Delaware's caseload became severely congested, leading to extended schedules and renewed interest in transfer motions to less crowded districts.
The "regular and established place of business" prong has produced its own line of decisions. The Federal Circuit's Cray test sets a high bar; an employee working from home in the district, without more, is typically not enough. In re ZTE (USA) Inc., 890 F.3d 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018), confirmed that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing proper venue. The interaction between the venue test and § 1404(a) transfer-for-convenience standards has continued to shape forum selection.
Mandamus practice expanded after TC Heartland. The Federal Circuit has used mandamus to police venue rulings, particularly to enforce TC Heartland's narrowing of "resides" and to police § 1404(a) transfers in busy districts.
Open questions and pressure points
Several pressure points remain. First, the application of TC Heartland to limited liability companies and other unincorporated entities is not always crisp. Courts generally treat an LLC as residing where its members reside or where it is organized, but the analogy to corporations is incomplete and varies by district.
Second, the boundaries of "regular and established place of business" continue to evolve. Modern distributed work, third-party logistics, and customer-facing retail operations all raise questions about what counts as "of the defendant" under Cray. The Federal Circuit has resolved many specific configurations but has not articulated a single overarching test.
Third, the foreign-defendant rule from Brunette remains an exception that swallows much of the rule for non-U.S. corporations. As global commerce intensifies, plaintiffs increasingly target foreign-headquartered companies, and the venue analysis bifurcates between domestic-only and worldwide defendants.
Fourth, TC Heartland generated reform proposals in Congress. Proposals to amend § 1400(b) to address forum-shopping concerns have circulated since the decision, and case-management rules in the post-TC Heartland districts have been an alternative response. As of the date of this entry, no major statutory amendment has been enacted.
Fifth, the relationship between proper venue under § 1400(b) and discretionary transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) has become increasingly important. Even where venue is proper in Waco or Delaware, defendants regularly seek transfer to a more convenient forum, and the Federal Circuit has been willing to grant mandamus to enforce the § 1404 standards. The combined practical effect of the venue statute, the convenience-transfer statute, and aggressive mandamus review has reshaped the forum dynamics that TC Heartland set in motion.
Citation and record
Formal citation: TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 581 U.S. 258 (2017).
Below: In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (denying mandamus), reversing the Federal Circuit's denial.
Author: Justice Thomas for a unanimous eight-Justice Court. Argued March 27, 2017; decided May 22, 2017. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision.
Vote alignment: 8-0 (Gorsuch, J., not participating).
See also
- Patent venueThe doctrinal home of the § 1400(b) framework.
- Eastern District of TexasThe district most affected by the post-TC Heartland reallocation.
- Western District of TexasA leading post-TC Heartland destination, especially the Waco Division.
- District of DelawareFrequent venue under § 1400(b)'s "resides" prong because many corporations are organized there.
- Northern District of CaliforniaA common venue for technology-company defendants.
- Federal Circuit appealsMandamus is the primary vehicle for venue review.
- DiscoveryLocal patent rules vary across post-TC Heartland destination districts.
Last reviewed: 2026